【英语中国】亚洲防务专家谈中国军力全球化

China is expanding its military capabilities, shifting its role from coastal defense to protecting the country's interests on a global scale. In 'The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global,' Larry M. Wortzel, a specialist in Asian defense and counterintelligence issues, assesses China's strategic objectives and military capabilities -- as well as the policy challenges for the U.S.

China Real Time spoke with the author, a commissioner of the congressionally appointed U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, former director of the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, and a 32-year veteran of the U.S. military. Edited excerpts:

The main theme of your book is China is trying to project power well beyond its borders. What is driving this expanding view of national interests?

China has expanded its military orientation from a focus primarily on the immediate periphery in response to changes in national interest. China has developed economic interests in other regions, including Africa, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Strategists in China realized these expanded interests may require a capacity to defend them, as well as the sea and air lines of communication vital to China's trade and need for raw materials and energy resources.

The major shift in orientation is reflected in a December 2004 speech by [former Communist Party chief] Hu Jintao. Hu charged the PLA with 'reinforcing the armed forces' loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party; helping to ensure China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic security to continue national development; helping to safeguard China's expanding national interests; and promoting world peace and development.' The recognition that the PLA must be prepared to defend expanding national interests opened the door for military planners to develop strategies and field equipment that could operate globally.

Your book describes the transformation of the Chinese military -- from naval power and ground warfare to ballistic missiles as well as space and cyber capabilities. What are China's successes in this drive and where is it still lagging behind?

The People's Liberation Army has been very successful in building its ballistic and cruise missile forces, and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture to ensure these missiles can be accurately targeted in precision strikes. This also has translated into success in space systems, including tracking and data relay satellites and an indigenous global positioning and timing system, Beidou (Compass). The PLA has shown itself to be fast and good at producing new naval combat ships and submarines. A decade or so ago, they depended on foreign purchases for targeting technology and fire control. Today, because of reverse-engineering and espionage (including cyber espionage), Chinese industries are producing their own fire control systems. The PLA is very good at electronic warfare and cyber operations. Its major weaknesses are still in designing and fielding new combat aircraft and bombers, and especially in producing jet engines for those aircraft.

What objectives do you see for China's military planners in the event of conflict? What does that mean for the U.S?

China's military planners believe they need a strategy that will allow the PLA to counter any attempts by other countries at intervening in any conflict that may develop in the East China Sea, South China Sea or over Taiwan. This 'counter-intervention strategy' (fan jieru ) has been called by the United States an 'anti-access/area denial strategy.' The U.S. term accounts for both the PLA's goal of maintaining sea control inside the 'first island chain,' as the PLA has termed it. This first island chain includes the area from southern Japan, the east side of Taiwan, the west side of the Philippines, and the 'nine-dotted-line' that Beijing claims in the South China Sea. Basically, it is comprised of the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

Inside what the PLA calls a 'second island chain,' they want to deny another military the ability to operate freely in time of conflict. The second island chain as envisioned by the Chinese runs from the area around Tokyo Bay through the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau to West Papua in Indonesia. China's Navy has increased in size and now includes combat logistics forces to support naval task forces at sea. Also, the Air Force has bombers equipped with cruise missiles that can help deny that area of the sea to foreign forces, and the PLA has developed an anti-ship ballistic missile that can attack moving large ships, like aircraft carriers.

The resulting U.S. strategy and operating concept to address the counter-intervention strategy is the 'AirSea Battle Concept.' From a strategic standpoint, this means encouraging and assisting where possible the nations around the South and East China seas to work together and to build their own defense forces to meet any challenges from China and counter aggressive behavior by the PLA. From an operational standpoint, AirSea Battle envisions U.S. forces striking the places in China that enable the C4ISR system used for targeting enemy forces in time of conflict. In this sense, should it come to a conflict, AirSea Battle as an operating concept could lead to escalation.

How does the potential flash point of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands fit into this volatile mix?

China understands that the U.S. position on the Senkakus, which Beijing calls the Diaoyu Islands, is different from the position the U.S. takes on conflicting island claims in the South China Sea. The U.S. has made it clear that the defense treaty with Japan extends to the Senkaku Islands, administration over which the U.S. gave to Japan. In the South China Sea, the U.S. takes no position on conflicting territorial claims, but holds the position that disputes should be settled peacefully and that conflict would endanger the use of those waters for commerce.

While the U.S. and China enjoy significant ties in economic and political arenas, there has been only modest progress in military-to-military contacts. Are such ties useful and what prospects are there for deepening them?

I do not believe economic ties alone are sufficient to deter conflict. Nor do I believe China would avoid conflict because of substantial foreign investment there, or its investments in the U.S., if the Communist Party leadership believed there was a significant threat to what it defines as China's sovereignty. Military contacts are useful as confidence- and security-building measures. Also they facilitate the exchange of views on what actions by one side may create a conflict by the other. Still, the U.S. and China differ considerably on interpretations of the Law of the Sea related to military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones, and thus far, military-to-military conflicts have done nothing to resolve these differences. There have been no direct substantive exchanges on strategic nuclear doctrine and strategic warning, on warfare in space, or on cyber-attacks. These are potential flash points. Finally, I believe basic U.S. policy should be to avoid any military contacts that would strengthen the PLA, improve the PLA's ability to further repress the Chinese populace, or improve the PLA's capacity to threaten U.S. friends and allies.

Your book discusses media warfare. Who is tasked with this in the Chinese military and what are the objectives?

The General Political Department of the PLA seeks to shape messages to foreigners and to manage perceptions of China in foreign countries. Some messages are directed at Taiwan, while others argue that one-party rule is best for China and other countries should accept this. Some activities focus on domestic attitudes in China, while others are designed to counter the influence of Western media in China. The PLA and the Party Propaganda Department also put messages intended to influence foreign opinion or actions into international media, suggesting for instance, that the Ryukyu Island chain, part of Japan, historically belonged to China. One media action that seemed to backfire was a suggestion that the ancient Koryo Kingdom, which encompassed part of Manchuria and part of North Korea, is Chinese territory. This effort led to strong reactions in North and South Korea.

Your book was published before former U.S. defense contractor Edward Snowden went public with explosive accusations. Do you see this as changing the U.S.-China debate over surveillance and cyber warfare?

All nations conduct espionage, and the conduct of espionage -- alone -- is not a cause for war. The fact that Edward Snowden apparently revealed some elements of U.S. electronic and cyber monitoring does not affect the U.S.-China debate over surveillance and cyber warfare. China's cyber espionage has focused on stealing intellectual property and industrial technology, as well as business intelligence.

The report by the Mandiant Corporation, two reports for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and statements by senior U.S. officials make it clear the PLA and other Chinese government agencies are taking information obtained through espionage and turning it over to Chinese industries. The United States does not engage in these practices. So the focus of any discussion between the U.S. and China are on the theft of intellectual property.

Another use of cyber espionage is to reconnoiter computer networks to facilitate attack in time of conflict. This could be a very escalatory practice because Chinese military doctrine calls for attacks on the enemy's critical infrastructure at the start of a conflict or immediately before one breaks out. With respect to discussions on cyber-attacks, the U.S. has focused on penetrations by China designed to gather information on religious or political groups in the U.S. and on the theft of intellectual property, while the PRC side has tried to focus discussions on controlling and restricting access to the Internet.

China has pledged not to make a first nuclear strike, but your book says this pledge ultimately could be abandoned under pressure from Chinese military planners. Could you elaborate?

China's military doctrine emphasizes the importance of surprise, seizing the initiative in war, and striking first. Yet there are contradictory elements that suggest 'absorbing a first strike and then retaliating.' I have watched the PLA build its nuclear and missile capacity for over three decades. PLA nuclear forces and posture are still essentially a defensive and retaliatory force. China has not built the sort of first-strike, offensive forces that characterized the Soviet Union. But there is a debate in China on the idea of no-first-use. Some younger military officers and scholars argue China should not be bound by this policy. The PLA doctrinal book, 'The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns,' is ambiguous about the policy. It says in one place that 'in general cases' China adheres to a no-first-use policy; but it does not say what might cause the Central Military Commission to depart from these 'general cases.'

I think Chinese military and political leaders calculate that the U.S. is far more averse to nuclear attacks on its soil than is China. I fear, however, that they may well miscalculate U.S. will, and may miscalculate how the U.S. might react to China's use of tactical nuclear weapons at sea, or against American allies.

On the U.S. side, we really don't know how China might react to strikes by the U.S. on the Chinese mainland, which is one of the features of AirSea Battle. In my view, the U.S. and China really should be engaged in direct strategic talks, such as those we had with the former Soviet Union. These exchanges fostered strategic stability.

中国正在扩张军力，将军队的角色从海岸防卫转向保护中国在全球范围内的利益。亚洲防务及反间谍事务专家沃策尔(Larry M. Wortzel)在其新书《巨龙延伸：中国军力走向全球化》(The Dragon Extends Its Reach: Chinese Military Power Goes Global)中评估了中国的战略目标和军事能力，以及对美国形成的政策挑战。

Courtesy Larry M. Wortzel图为1989年，当时的美国陆军少校、美国驻华大使馆副武官沃策尔（中）参加解放军空军在开封的一次跳伞。1989年天安门事件后，两国间此类军事接触中断。《中国实时报》记者采访了沃策尔。他是由美国国会任命的美中经济和安全审议委员会(U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission)委员，曾任美国传统基金会(Heritage Foundation)亚洲研究中心(Asian Studies Center)主任，同时还是在美国军队服役32年的老兵。以下为经过编辑的采访内容：

你新书的主题是，中国正试图在远离国境之外的地方投射影响力。是什么推动了这种国家利益观点的扩大？

中国军队定位已经从主要关注直接相邻的周边地区向外扩大，这是对国家利益变化做出的回应。中国已经在非洲、南亚、拉美和中东等其他地区发展出了自己的经济利益。中国的战略家们认识到，这些扩大的利益可能需要相应的能力去捍卫，同样需要捍卫的还有对于中国贸易以及原材料和能源需求至关重要的海上和空中交通航线。

定位的重大变化反映在中共前总书记胡锦涛2004年12月的一次讲话中。胡锦涛向中国人民解放军提出要求：为中国共产党巩固执政地位提供重要的力量保证，为维护国家发展的重要战略机遇期提供坚强的安全保障，为维护国家利益提供有力的战略支撑，为维护世界和平与促进共同发展发挥重要作用。有关解放军必须为捍卫不断扩张的国家利益做好准备的认识为军事规划人员打开了大门，据此发展出能在全球发挥作用的战略和战场装备。

你的书描述了中国军队的转型——从海上力量和地面战争转向弹道导弹以及空间和网络作战能力。中国在这方面取得了哪些成功，在哪些地方仍然落后？

中国人民解放军非常成功地创建了弹道导弹和巡航导弹部队，以及指挥、控制、通信、计算机、情报及监视与侦察(C4ISR)体系，以确保其导弹在精确打击行动中能够准确定位。这一点也带来了空间体系上的成就，包括跟踪卫星和数据中继卫星以及本土的全球定位和定时系统“北斗”。解放军已经展示出其擅长快速制造新的海军战斗舰艇和潜艇。大约10年前，他们依赖从外国购买的定位技术和火力控制技术。如今，由于逆向工程和间谍活动（包括网络间谍活动），中国工厂正制造自己的火力控制系统。解放军非常擅长电子战和网络作战。其主要弱点仍然是设计及部署新型战斗机和轰炸机，尤其是为这些飞机生产喷气式发动机。

你认为在发生冲突的情况下，中国军事规划人员的目标是什么？对于美国来说意味着什么？

Potomac Books中国的军事规划人员认为，他们需要这样一个战略，那就是解放军要能够制衡任何其他国家介入任何在东中国海、南中国海或因台湾而发生的冲突的企图。这种“反介入”战略在美国被称为“反进入和区域阻绝战略”。美国用的这一术语阐明了解放军在“第一岛链”内维持制海权的目标。第一岛链包括从日本海南部、台湾东部、菲律宾西部到南中国海的中国“九段线”(nine-dotted-line)区域。基本上来说就是包括东中国海和南中国海。

在所谓的“第二岛链”之内，解放军想要遏制另一方军力在发生冲突时自由调动的能力。中国设想的第二岛链从东京湾附近穿过北马里亚纳群岛、关岛、密克罗尼西亚联邦和帕劳到印尼的西巴布亚。中国海军已经扩大了规模，如今已经有战斗后勤军力来支持海上的海军作战部队。而且，空军还有搭载了巡航导弹的轰炸机，能够帮助遏制该区域的外国军事力量，解放军已经开发出了一种反舰弹道导弹，能够打击行驶中的大型舰船，比如航母。

结果就是，美国形成了“空海一体战概念”来应对反介入战略。从战略的角度来讲，这就等于是鼓励并协助南中国海和东中国海周围的国家在任何可能的情况下携起手来，构建自己的防御体系，应对来自中国的挑战并反制解放军的侵犯行为。从军事行动的角度来讲，“空海一体战”设想的是美军打击中国的领土，导致冲突期间C4ISR体系被用来瞄准敌军武力。在这种意义上，如果一旦发生冲突，“空海一体战”作为一种军事行动概念可能导致局势升级。

日本称尖阁列岛、中国称钓鱼岛的岛屿是潜在的冲突点，它们在这一不稳定局势中的角色是怎样的？

中国知道美国在尖阁列岛——北京叫钓鱼岛——问题上的立场，与美国在南中国海存在的主权争议所持立场不同。美国已经清楚地表明，与日本的防御条约涵盖了这些岛屿，美国将这些岛屿的管理权给了日本。在南中国海，美国对领土主权争议不持立场，但坚持认为，应该通过和平的方式解决争议，而且冲突会给利用相关水域进行贸易带来危险。

美国和中国在经济和政治方面有着密切的联系，但在军事接触方面只取得了一点点进展。军事方面的联系有用吗？深化这方面联系的前景如何？

我不认为仅凭经济联系就足以阻止冲突，我也不认为如果共产党领导层认为其所定义的中国主权受到了重大威胁的话，中国会因为外国在中国有大量投资，或中国在美国有大量投资而回避冲突。作为增进互信、加强安全的手段，军事接触是有用的。而且，军事接触还能促进双方交流观点，对于一方的哪些行动会被另一方认为将造成冲突有所了解。不过，美国和中国在对《联合国海洋法公约》(Law of the Sea)有关在专属经济区内的军事行动的规定存在不同的解读，而且截至目前，军事接触对于解决这些分歧丝毫没有起到作用。在战略核武器原则和战略警报方面，在空间战争方面，或是在网络攻击方面，双方并没有大量的直接交流。这些都是潜在的引爆点。最后，我认为美国最基本的政策应该是，对于任何可能增强解放军的实力、提高解放军进一步压制中国民众的能力、或是增强解放军威胁美国朋友和盟友的实力的接触，美国都要尽量避免。

你的书讨论了媒体战争。中国军队中由谁来承担这个任务，其目标又是什么？

解放军总政治部试图主导向外国人发出的信息，并影响外国对于中国的看法。一些信息针对的是台湾，还有一些则声称，一党制对中国来说是最好的，其他国家应当接受这一点。一些活动重点关注中国国内的态度，另外一些旨在应对西方媒体在中国的影响。解放军和中共中央宣传部还向国际媒体发布旨在影响外国舆论或行动的消息，比如说，声称日本的琉球群岛在历史上曾经属于中国。一次似乎造成了反效果的媒体行动是，声称古代高丽王国（由中国东北部分地区和朝鲜部分地区构成）属于中国版图。这一举动引起了朝鲜和韩国的强烈反应。

你的书出版之前，美国国防部前承包商雇员斯诺登(Edward Snowden)公开了爆炸性的指责。你认为这是否改变了美中有关监视和网络战争方面的辩论？

所有国家都会进行间谍活动，而间谍行为本身并不构成战争的理由。斯诺登显然揭露了美国电子和网络监控活动的一些方面，这一事实并不影响美中有关监视和网络战争方面的辩论。中国的网络间谍活动重点是窃取知识产权和工业技术，以及商业情报。

电脑安全公司Mandiant Corporation的报告、美中经济和安全审议委员会的两份报告以及美国高级官员的声明都清楚地表明，解放军和其他中国政府机构正在不断接收通过间谍行动获取的信息，并将之交给中国工业企业。美国并不从事此类活动。因此美国和中国之间的任何讨论重点都是窃取知识产权的行为。

网络间谍活动的另一个用途是侦查电脑网络，以便在冲突时实现攻击行动。这种行动可能会越来越多，因为中国军事学说要求在冲突开始或即将爆发时攻击敌方的关键基础设施。在有关网络攻击的讨论方面，美国的重点是中国旨在收集美国宗教或政治组织信息的渗透活动，以及窃取知识产权的活动，而中方试图将讨论集中在控制和限制互联网访问上面。

中国承诺不首先进行核打击，但你的书中说，在中国军事规划人员施压之下，这一承诺最终有可能被放弃。能否详细谈谈？

中国军事学说强调出其不意、在战争中掌握主动以及先发制人的重要性。然而“经受首次打击之后实施报复”的说法存在矛盾之处。我在30多年的时间里观察了解放军发展核武和导弹能力的行动。解放军核力量和态势基本上仍然是防御性和报复性的力量。中国尚未建立苏联特色的进行首次打击的攻击性力量。但中国对于不首先使用核武的理念存在争论。一些年轻一代的军官和学者认为，中国不应当受这一政策束缚。解放军的军事理论教材《第二炮兵战役学》对于这一政策含糊其辞。一方面它说，在通常情况下，中国坚持不首先使用核武的政策；但没有说明什么样的情况会被中央军委认定为不属于“通常情况”。

我认为中国军队和政治领导人的算盘是，美国比中国更不愿意让自己的本土遭到核攻击。然而我担心，他们对于美国的意愿可能大大地估计错误，并且可能错误地估计了美国可能如何应对中国在海上或针对美国盟友使用战术核武器的情况。

从美国这方面来说，我们其实并不知道中国可能如何响应美国对中国大陆的打击，而后者是“空海一体战”的特点之一。在我看来，美国和中国应当进行直接战略谈判，我们曾与前苏联进行过此类谈判。这样的交流有助于战略稳定。